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Timothy S.  George 
 Of course Japan matters. It was the first non-Western nation to have a 
constitution and to industrialize. It avoided being colonized and became a 
colonial power itself. It plunged into a devastating war that killed tens of 
millions in East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific and ended with Japan as 
the first and only nation to suffer the horrors of nuclear warfare. In defeat, 
Japan arose from the ashes of war to become an even greater industrial power 
while simultaneously establishing itself as a vibrant, pacifist, and contentious 
democracy. Japan ’ s spectacular economic growth made it a model for its 
neighbors and even, at the height of its economic dominance and hubris 
in the 1980s, a model for business leaders in the Americas, Europe, and 
Pacific Asia. By the early 1990s, the collapse of mammoth real estate and 
stock market bubbles launched the nation on two decades of stagnation or 
fitful growth, deflation, and soul searching. And then, on 11 March 2011, 
the state ’ s anemic response to the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster 
in northeastern Japan heightened popular debate over whether the nation 
was doomed to a slow decline or might yet be able to recover its vigor and 
discover a new path and new purposes. 
 The flurry of media coverage that erupted after the T ō hoku Earthquake in 
March 2011, known in Japan as the Great East Japan Earthquake, focused an 
intense global interest on Japan, interest that then faded just as it had during 
the long recession of the 1990s. International media interest in Japan during 
the affluent decade of the 1980s arose from what appeared to be the start 
of an era that would be defined by Japan and East Asia ’ s Tiger Economies. 
And then the bubble burst. While financial reports seem to regularly declare 
Japan  “ out of recession, ” media discussions in and outside Japan after 
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March of 2011 remained haunted by the devastation inflicted by one of 
the strongest earthquakes in recorded human history. Yet the earthquake, 
tsunami, and nuclear disaster that swept across eastern Japan seem to have 
merely intensified the preceding two decades of political paralysis at the top, 
and a sense of frustration and hopelessness at the bottom. 
 Politicians, intellectuals, and philanthropists have all publicly wondered 
whether Japan really matters anymore. Of course Japan matters — but not 
in the way most journalists, commentators, business leaders, and politicians 
have been talking about it these last few decades. The problem lies in how 
media attention more than scholarly debate has driven the discussion of 
what lessons Japan has and has not yet learned from its successes and 
failures. Actual scholarship on Japan generally receives less attention than 
it ought. While many members of the international media are often eager to 
report on the successes and failures of Japan, a disturbing majority prefer to 
explain the so-called secrets of Japan ’ s success, and many public failings, as 
resulting from a quaint culture defined by its relationship with the traditional 
and not at all by social, political, or even economic forces that shape the 
contemporary world. 
 These sorts of media reports have deflected attention from some very real 
problems, such as how the Japanese state will finance the reconstruction of the 
quake-devastated Northeast — much less ensure the welfare of a population 
that is anticipated by 2020 to be comprised of more septuagenarians than 
teenagers. This is a shame not only because of the missed opportunity to 
discuss Japan in a meaningful way, but also because Japan ’ s achievements 
since the end of the nineteenth century remain a highly relevant yardstick 
for policy makers, business leaders, and citizenry across the globe. Having 
been the first Asian nation to achieve modern economic power, by blazing 
paths that have had substantial influence on the developing world, Japan 
in the twenty-first century has become the first nation in Pacific Asia to 
struggle with the consequences of declining industrial significance. While 
this is an unwanted and perhaps dubious honor, it is no less the fact that 
Japan shares its current trajectory with many highly industrialized societies 
even while remaining a model of achievement for much of the developing 
world. 
 Japan is not the only nation to face the sorts of problems we have 
generally thought characteristic of a postindustrial society. There is yet 
much to be learned from the mistakes and successes of a society that, despite 
everything, still features the highest standard of living in East Asia. Indeed, 
most of the highly industrialized nations of Europe and the Americas have 
faced the social, economic, and political problems that arise in the wake of 
high youth unemployment, aging populations, industrial decline, financial 
crises, and even natural disasters. Why so many of us worry about whether 
or not Japan matters is in itself a worrying question, motivated by a fear 
that the standard of living enjoyed by most Japanese since the 1960s was 
only sustainable by ever-expanding production built on the premise that 
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Japan was the world ’ s industrial base. With decreasing birth rates and a 
general shift of industrial production overseas, many Japanese have come 
to believe that the inevitable result is the end of affluence and the start of a 
long decline into irrelevance. 
 While one aim of this book is to offer comparative contexts for Japan ’ s 
recent history in a way that may prove useful in understanding the world ’ s 
emerging industrial and postindustrial societies, there are, however, 
problematic antecedents to this endeavor. Making Japan matter has long 
been the purpose of the field of Japanese Studies. At the height of the 
Cold War, the United States government sponsored a series of scholarly 
workshops presenting modern Japan and Turkey as alternatives to the 
Marxist models under consideration in much of the developing world. 
Both Japan and Turkey took paths that significantly diverged from those 
predicted by the  “ modernization theorists ” who decided the course of much 
of our field with a series of workshops held in Kyoto and Tokyo, and the 
rapid, unexpected growth of the Japanese economy significantly shifted 
the global balance of economic power. By the 1980s, intellectual fashions 
had shifted to decrying Japan ’ s unprecedented economic success. The so-
called “Japan-bashers” of the 1980s made the contradictory claims that a 
unique culture, ethnocentric outlook, and collusive relationships said to 
characterize Japanese society gave  “ Japan, Inc. ” an unfair advantage in the 
global marketplace. 
 The  “ Cold War ” and  “ Trade War ” frameworks failed to provide nuanced 
consideration of what it meant for Japan to experience the first 40 years 
of the postwar era. It often takes dramatic turning points or conceptual 
breakthroughs to make us see the past more clearly, and to see it as truly 
past. For much longer than necessary, Japan ’ s experiences after 1945, or after 
the Allied Occupation ended in 1952, were not seen as appropriate subjects 
for study by historians. Despite professional disdain, even animosity, toward 
those who wrote the history of Japan since 1945, two things emerged to 
lend credibility to the study of postwar Japan as history. The first was the 
sense that an era had ended for Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s with 
the death of Hirohito, the bursting of the financial bubble, the end of the 
Cold War, and the economic development of China. 
 The second was the publication in 1993, as that awareness of historic 
change was setting in, of  Postwar Japan as History , a pioneering collection 
of essays that inspired a new generation of historians to look at Japan 
since the war through a wide variety of lenses. 1 The feeling that times had 
changed, which had set in over the several years since the book was first 
conceived, made it all the more timely and added to its impact on the field. 
The  “ Japan-bashing ” by pundits and leaders of business and government 
in the 1980s may have been replaced since the 1990s by  “ Japan-passing ” 
as they flocked to China, but at the same time, thanks partly to  Postwar 
Japan as History , there has been an explosion of innovative scholarship 
on postwar Japan. The book moved the discussion of Japan beyond the 
Jpan.indb   3 8/18/2012   1:27:25 PM
JAPAN SINCE 19454
then-dominant narratives by introducing a nuanced historical consideration 
of what it meant for Japan to experience rapid economic growth during the 
first 40 years of the postwar era. 
 As the field took shape in the mid-1990s, a renaissance of scholarship 
began to suggest new frameworks for thinking about the society, politics, 
economy, and culture of postwar Japan. Some scholars even found 
room for the modernization narrative of the 1960s, despite its Cold War 
origins, since by the 1980s it had become a defining myth for the postwar 
national consciousness. The naturalization of the ideas constructed by the 
modernization theorists of the 1960s made Japan matter in a way that it had 
not mattered before. That even the Japanese came to see Japan ’ s  “ economic 
miracle ” as part and parcel of what it meant to be Japanese was a construct 
made real by the power of belief as much as by the wealth created during 
the rapid economic growth of the postwar era. Indeed, the past two decades 
of lament over the decline of Japan might be seen as an expression of the 
power and persistence of the modernization mythology. 
 At several points in Japan ’ s modern trajectory — particularly 1868, when 
its centralized feudal system was replaced by a centralizing and modernizing 
imperial government, and 1945, when its land, people, and governing 
ideology were devastated — it has been fashionable for some to argue that 
it was starting anew with a clean slate; that it had  “ no history. ” The triple 
disasters of March 2011 have similarly been described as a break with the 
past. This collection of essays cannot attempt to predict how or whether 
those disasters will change Japan or the ways its history is told. But it is 
the consensus of the contributors to this volume that, whatever directions 
Japan takes now, it will be building on its past, particularly its experiences, 
accomplishments, and failures in the period since 1945. Our purpose here is 
to sample some parts of that experience — and of the extensive and thought-
provoking study of Japan since the mid-twentieth century that has flowered 
in the past two decades — in the hope of better understanding where Japan 
is and what trajectories it may follow from here. 
 This book is divided into four sections, in which the authors individually 
explore issues of civic life, the legacies of war and military occupation, the 
emergence of a postindustrial economy, and the interaction of public memory 
with the social, political, and economic trajectories from the postwar to 
the post-bubble eras. The intellectual boundaries where history leaves 
off and other disciplines begin can be complex to navigate, and therefore 
these essays are necessarily interdisciplinary in their consideration of the 
simultaneous transformations that defined the emergence of contemporary 
Japan. They examine the historical context to the social, cultural, and 
political underpinnings of Japan ’ s postwar and postindustrial trajectories. 
 By reengaging earlier discourses and introducing new veins of research, 
they raise questions about the extent to which the history of Japan since 
1945 might yet serve as an indicator for the economic and social trajectories 
partly shared with the late-capitalist, heavily industrialized societies of 
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Europe, North America, and Pacific Asia. Often integrating gender, class, 
and race within thematic narrative frames, the multidisciplinary essays 
explore topics that range from the postwar histories of the plight of Japan ’ s 
disabled veterans of World War II and the rise of women ’ s professional 
organizations within the political machinations of electoral politics, to the 
recent histories of the state ’ s efforts to formulate industrial policy and foster 
financial reform, to the contemporary context of resource management 
strategies within Japan ’ s rural communities. 
 These essays encourage us to take fresh looks at the ways the Japanese 
and those outside Japan have defined and understood its postwar paths. 
They also insist that there are no simple answers to the question of when or 
whether the postwar period has ended, or what the decisive turning points 
since 1945 have been. In complicating these questions by approaching them 
from a multiplicity of angles, the authors may even offer some hints as to 
what to look for as debates develop about whether the disasters of 11 March 
2011 constituted a decisive turning point in postwar Japanese history. 
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 Par t  One 
 Civic Imaginations 
 Japan ’ s war in Pacific Asia from 1931 to 1945 wrought the greatest bloodshed 
the region had ever known, with a total cost in lives that may have reached 
as many as 20 million people dead. 1 Yet, the domestic experience of war, 
culminating with the incendiary bombings of Tokyo and Osaka and nuclear 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, also brought death and hardship 
to many ordinary Japanese. In the wake of Japan ’ s surrender in August 
1945, war crimes tribunals tried, convicted, and hanged only a handful of 
the political and military leaders who were most responsible for the war. 
While issues of war responsibility remained unresolved, the people and 
government of postwar Japan were remarkable for their ability to convert 
the experiences of the wartime era into productive, long-lived alliances with 
many of Japan ’ s former enemies. 
 Positioning themselves in the dual role of proconsul and tutor, the mostly 
American officials of the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945 – 52) translated 
their social and political vision of democracy into a constitutional monarchy 
for Japan that embraced the rights of free speech, gender equality, and a 
minimum guaranteed level of cultured living. While the Allied Occupation 
is often characterized as a  “ New Deal ” for Japan, reactionary strains within 
American political discourse, in particular the rise of anti-Communism and 
the onset of the Cold War, also had tremendous repercussions for Japan. 
As consequence, there are numerous historical problems from this era 
with which scholars must grapple, some of which we have discussed in the 
introduction to this book. 
 One persistent myth about Japan is that it has suffered for its lack of 
a historical tradition of an engaged citizenry. Yet, the Meiji, Taish ō , and 
even the early Sh ō wa eras (1868 – 1912, 1912 – 26, and 1926 – 31) witnessed 
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considerable political activity, some of it quite radical. And the postwar years 
saw an even greater level of civic engagement. Indeed, the postwar era was 
a model of democratic capitalism even though the citizen movements of the 
era are rarely remembered. As a result, the postwar era is largely remembered 
within the narrow, sometimes stultifying context of the  “ economic miracle ” 
narrative. 
 While the 1950s are customarily thought of as the era that saw the 
emergence of one-party rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 
same period also saw an upsurge in civic organizations and mass movements 
at odds with the state. From the efforts by the citizens of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki to see the end of the nuclear arms race to the unionization 
struggles led by coal miners who sought to force their employers to provide 
basic safety equipment and pay fair wages, the 1950s were indeed witness to 
social and economic turmoil at odds with the middle-class family lives most 
often portrayed by television and motion picture melodramas. 
 By 1960, the political dissatisfactions of millions of Japanese had grown 
into a national movement calling for the rescinding of military treaties 
with the United States that most Japanese believed to have been agreed 
to without popular consent. These dissatisfactions grew by the end of the 
decade into national movements calling for the end of Japanese support for 
the Vietnam War and the reversion of Okinawa from American to Japanese 
sovereignty, while local civic movements focused on industrial pollution in 
Minamata and resistance to state encroachment upon the rights of farmers 
in Narita. The national social movements of the 1960s were squelched by 
extraparliamentary and occasionally extrajudicial action, as well as by co-
optation; yet, many of the politically active refocused their civic engagement 
onto more local concerns. 
 The social movements from the late 1950s to the early 1970s defined the 
outer boundaries of democracy in Japan. Citizen involvement in national 
political movements, enthusiastic for the first 15 years of the postwar era, 
hit several road blocks between 1960 and 1970 that demarcated what has 
customarily been characterized as a decline in participatory democracy and 
the consolidation of one-party rule. Although leftist political movements 
exerted considerable influence on postwar politics, the center-right emerged 
as the more powerful force. The formation of the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) in 1955 marked the beginning of an era of conservative politics that 
remained the norm until 2009. 
 Part One features chapters exploring how Japan ’ s postwar democracy 
translated into — or was defined by — local practice by examining the shape 
of civic engagement that developed in local communities nonetheless 
influenced by the national politics that flowed to and from the capital city. 
By reconstructing narratives of civic life in a historically significant satellite 
of Tokyo and two towns deep in Japan ’ s rural periphery, each examines 
from a different angle the structures of civil society that emerged within the 
postwar constitutional order. Running against a tide of literature that depicts 
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postwar Japan as a nation driven by an interventionist state in league with 
vertically integrated marketing and banking systems, the chapters in this 
section reconstruct a more accurate portrait of civic life in postwar Japan 
than those focused on the national center. 
 “Civic Imaginations” explores what Japan ’ s postwar democracy meant 
at the local level. Laura Hein, Timothy S. George, and Martin Dusinberre 
each examine the shape of civic engagement that developed in communities 
outside Tokyo that were nonetheless influenced by the national politics 
of the capital city. Chapters by George and Dusinberre also explore the 
boundaries of the nostalgic longing for  “ traditional ” village Japan that 
accompanied the rise of the  “ furusato ” (native place) movement in the 
1990s. By reconstructing narratives of civic life and regional identity, these 
chapters examine from a different angle the structures of civil society that 
emerged within the postwar constitutional order. 
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 Par t  Two 
 Legacies of War 
and Occupation 
 If anything has been proven by the endless debates about when or whether the 
 “ postwar ” has ended, it is that Japan has never escaped the long shadow of 
its Asia-Pacific War. The  “ postwar ” was declared over many times, including 
when the Allied Occupation ended in 1952, again when the nation ’ s GNP 
regained its prewar peak in 1955, when Japan ’ s economy passed that of West 
Germany in 1968 to become the third largest in the world after those of the 
two superpowers, once again in the 1980s when Japan was the world ’ s largest 
creditor and foreign aid donor and home to the world ’ s ten largest banks, and 
in 1989 when the Sh ō wa emperor died after 63 years on the throne. 
 Yet, there remained ever-present reminders that the war was not buried in 
the past. Okinawa was occupied and administered by the United States until 
1972. Former victims of Japan ’ s invasion of the Asian continent reacted in 
anger in the 1980s and after, when textbooks in Japan called that invasion 
an  “ advance ” and Japanese politicians denied that there had been a Rape 
of Nanjing. Such discontent again appeared when Asia ’ s former  “ comfort 
women, ” forced into sexual slavery by Japan during the war, spoke out for 
the first time to demand compensation and apology. Throughout the postwar 
and into the twenty-first century, many Koreans and Chinese repeatedly 
insisted that Japan had never fully apologized for its actions. 
 Even the scenes of devastation left by the earthquake and tsunami 
in 2011 revived for many Japanese strong public memories of the hard times 
that followed in the wake of surrender in 1945, as did the Heisei emperor ’ s 
decision to address the Japanese people in the immediate aftermath of the 
March 2011 disasters as his father had done 66 years earlier. 
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 The decision by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East of 
1946 – 48 — the  “ Tokyo War Crimes Trial ” — to blame a small number of top 
leaders (not including the emperor) for the war further discouraged most 
Japanese from considering their individual responsibility for the nation ’ s 
actions. Many came to think of the war as a tragedy that had happened  to 
them, brought on by those above. Even more so for later generations, the 
shadow of the war was something bequeathed to them by others and with 
which they simply had to live. 
 Japan ’ s two constitutions — the Meiji constitution of 1890, and the current 
constitution in effect since 3 May 1947 — were both literally handed to the 
Japanese people from above, the former from the Meiji emperor and the 
latter from their postwar occupiers. The Allied Occupation, the legacies of 
the war, and the new constitution were an infrastructure that the Japanese 
could do little to change. What they could control, however, was how they 
responded to them, and what meanings their responses gave to them. In 
doing so, they were writing new chapters in the story of Japan ’ s continuing 
redefinition of its modern identity and its place in the world, a process that 
had been ongoing since the 1850s. 
 Conventional periodizations of history, which tend to focus on decisive 
breaks in 1868, 1945, and 1952, can obscure as much as they illuminate. 
David Obermiller shows how Okinawa experienced a much longer and very 
different sort of occupation, and how it complicated questions of national 
and regional identity. The ethnographic emphasis in American views of 
and policies toward Okinawa had a decidedly colonial flavor. So, too, did 
American attempts to shape the ways Okinawans defined themselves and 
remembered their past. Katarczyna Cwiertka describes the continuity in food 
shortages and distribution systems across the assumed great divide of defeat 
in August 1945. By focusing on patterns of distribution and consumption, she 
shows that actual practices did not always change immediately in the wake 
of changes in rulers, laws, and policies. Wartime mobilization strategies were 
found useful by citizens and occupiers alike in the early years after the war. 
 In the postwar period, marginalized groups with grievances, like all 
Japanese, were no longer subjects but citizens, with a much greater space 
for political activism. They could, in theory, choose between attempting to 
win seats at the tables of power to enable them to participate in making 
policies that affected them, or simply attempting to win recognition and 
compensation from  “ those above ” ( okami ). The nurses described by Sally A. 
Hastings chose the former path, organizing and electing representatives to 
the National Diet. She shows us the complicated nature of such gender and 
occupational politics, which involved not simply female nurses rebalancing 
their power vis- à -vis male doctors and politicians, but also contestations 
between nurses and midwives. Tetsuya Fujiwara ’ s disabled veterans chose 
to demand recognition, but in doing so they also had to contend with some 
of their own, the  “ white gown ” beggars who threatened to undermine their 
attempts to avoid social and economic marginalization. 
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 State Policy for 
a Late-Capitalist 
Society 
 Journalist and oft-quoted  “ Japan expert ” Karel van Wolferen, in his title 
for a controversial book, characterized the essence of Japan ’ s rise to global 
prominence as  The Enigma of Japanese Power . What he was referring 
to was not military but rather economic power. Written at the height of 
Japan ’ s economic success, van Wolferen ’ s book was an attempt to explain 
how Japan came to be the second largest economy in the world. Japan ’ s 
postwar  “ economic miracle ” is indeed an important subject for historical 
study, and the Japanese  “ success story ” has been both envied and resented 
throughout the world. Japan ’ s rapid rise to global economic prominence 
was by far the most famous of all its postwar accomplishments, yet many 
scholars and pundits have, since the bursting of the economic bubble in 
the early 1990s, sought to distance themselves from their earlier praise for 
Japan ’ s accomplishments by aiming harsh criticism at the state ’ s failure to 
effect economic recovery. There is, of course, an important back-story to 
this narrative. 
 Pundits and scholars often assert that economic policy was the secret 
of Japan ’ s postwar economic success. Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato ’ s 1960 
income-doubling policy, in part precipitated by the strong showing by labor 
in the social protest movements of the 1950s, combined with the rapid 
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economic growth of the middle and late 1960s to dramatically increase the 
standard of living of most Japanese households. By the end of the 1960s, 
the three Cs — car,  “ cooler ” (air conditioner), and color television — were the 
longed-for icons of Japan ’ s new material wealth. Unprecedented economic 
growth also enabled managers to refrain from mass layoffs while asserting 
that the company should be able to expect an ever greater commitment in 
return. Indeed, Japan ’ s unemployment rate remained well below 3 percent 
until the late 1980s. 
 By the mid-1970s, most blue- and white-collar families had, or would 
soon have, the car, color TV, and air conditioner that served as three key 
indicators of their social and economic aspirations. By the 1970s, the 
majority of Japanese considered themselves to be middle-class, but middle-
class affluence at the height of the economic boom of the 1980s took on a 
level of opulence unparalleled in modern history. But even at the height of 
the bubble years of the 1980s, it was becoming clear that Japanese affluence 
was built on unsustainable social, economic, and environmental models 
laid bare by the frenetic pace at which many Japanese sought to consume 
the trappings of extravagances theretofore unaffordable — from Gucci hand 
bags to gold-leaf sushi. 
 The economic bubble burst in 1991. Housing prices plummeted and 
suicide rates skyrocketed. Along with the increasingly bleak economic 
outlook came cultural and social issues that included the re-emergence of 
teenage prostitution ( enjo k ō sai or compensated dating) and increasing rates 
of unemployment and homelessness. Japan ’ s long nineties, also known as 
the lost decade, stretched well into the twenty-first century. In 2002, the 
national unemployment rate exceeded 5 percent for the first time since the 
early 1950s. When disaggregated, the data revealed a more troubling concern: 
the average unemployment rate for persons aged 15 – 24 was double that for 
the overall population. All through the decade preceding the 2011 T ō hoku 
Earthquake, aggregate wages continued to decline, the ratio of part-time 
temporary to full-time regular workers rose, and the unemployment rate 
hovered around 5 percent. Meanwhile, critics blamed the state for having 
failed to develop viable social health and welfare strategies for the ageing 
population while simultaneously failing to provide adequate employment 
training for the nation ’ s youth. Instead, pundits and politicians seemed keen 
on laying claim to their filial status while blaming young people for being 
too lazy to work. 
 The chapters of this section explore how state policy initiatives of the 
postwar era have shaped, to varying degrees of success, the economy and 
society of post-bubble Japan. “ State Policy for a Late Capitalist Society” 
reconstructs state policy initiatives of the postwar and post-bubble eras as 
means of examining the ways in which the state has attempted to address 
some of Japan ’ s most pressing policy problems. By examining the recent 
historical trajectory of industrial, fisheries, and financial policies, the chapters 
collectively examine how state policy initiatives, although not publicly 
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praised and not always for the better, nevertheless effected considerable 
changes to the relationship between the postwar state and producer. Bruce 
Aronson and Lonny Carlile focus specifically on economic policies centered 
in Tokyo that, with varying degrees of success, attempted to address the 
interconnected milieu of pressing economic and social problems. Narrating 
geographical and topical territory akin to those of the chapters by Martin 
Dusinberre and Timothy S. George, Satsuki Takahashi paints a portrait of 
fisheries policies for rural Japan that illustrates quite plainly the persistence 
of Japan ’ s historical rural/urban divide. All three chapters suggest ways in 
which the precedents of post-bubble policy may yet continue to shape the 
relationship between state and society in the wake of the 2011 T ō hoku 
Earthquake. 
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 Par t  Four 
 Looking Out, 
Looking Back 
 The fears and uncertainties of the 1990s and beyond, compounded by the 
triple disasters of March 2011, had no real precedents in Japan ’ s modern 
history. In the Meiji period (1868 – 1912), the national goals were clear, 
and neatly summed up in the slogan  “ rich nation, strong military ” ( fukoku 
ky ō hei ). Japan was engaged in a survival struggle to avoid colonization and 
to become strong enough not only to resist the great powers but also to 
become one of them. Its military and industrial might grew fast enough to 
enable it to defeat China and take Taiwan as its first colony in 1895, and 
to defeat Russia in 1905 and annex Korea in 1910 — and then to launch 
an ultimately disastrous assault on China, Southeast Asia, and the United 
States in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 After the defeat, the goals had to change, but before long they became 
equally clear. Rebuilding and recovery were the initial goals, of course. But 
in 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato announced his plan to double real 
income by the end of the decade. In return for dedicating themselves to the 
new god of GNP growth and renouncing the divisive labor and political 
strife that had ended earlier that year with the passage of the revised US-
Japan security treaty and quashing of the strike at Mitsui ’ s Miike coal mine, 
Japanese would be rewarded with affluence that would enable enhanced 
consumerism. 
 Before long, Japan was held up as a model for the development of other 
countries, particularly in East and Southeast Asia, and Malaysia was among 
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the first to adopt a  “ Look East ” policy explicitly rejecting the western model 
in favor of that attributed to Japan. In 1979, Ezra Vogel published  Japan as 
Number One , with the subtitle  Lessons for America . Soon, executives from 
the United States were visiting their former pupil and junior partner to learn 
the secrets of its success, while Japanese hubris was reflected in the bits of 
gold foil one could order sprinkled on sushi at exclusive restaurants. Japan 
was seen, and saw itself, as the successful pioneer and model in solving 
the problems of late-industrial capitalism, from urban crowding to labor-
management relations to industrial pollution. 
 The confidence, and the certainty about national goals, slipped away 
in the 1990s. The bubble burst, the Cold War ended, the population aged, 
rural areas hemorrhaged population and struggled to stay alive, and China 
continued its spectacularly rapid economic growth even longer than Japan 
had. Japan struggled to find its direction in what suddenly seemed to be a 
new and unfamiliar version of modernity, or postmodernity. There was much 
talk about the  “ Galapagos-ization ” of Japan, a turning inward, a giving up 
of grand dreams, and an acceptance that Japan ’ s global role and importance 
might shrink to the point where the nation would be ignored rather than 
copied by the rest of the world. It was no surprise that one response was to 
remember — or imagine — a time when things had been different. 
 Christine Yano takes us back to a time when the sky was the limit, when 
the world was about to become Japan ’ s oyster. Showing the way in the joys 
of global travel, leisure, and cosmopolitanism were Japanese stewardesses 
for Pan Am, who traveled abroad even before the relaxation of currency 
restrictions in 1964 allowed other Japanese to follow. America became 
a different sort of model, offering employment and freedom for young 
women and lessons in the consumption of leisure travel and media for a 
generation who had not known the war, or who seemed to have forgotten 
it. Christopher Gerteis reminds us, however, that the past was not always so 
easily left behind. The NYK shipping line ’ s redefinition of itself as Japan left 
the twentieth century and entered the twenty-first included new  “ corporate 
social responsibility ” practices that involved the presenting of its past. 
Its attempt to focus on the supposed glitter, cosmopolitanism, and good 
relations with Asia up through the interwar years, and to paint itself as a 
passive victim of the Pacific War, only served to demonstrate the difficulty 
of escaping the shadow of the war and of reshaping the past to serve the 
present. 
 Hiraku Shimoda ’ s description of the  Project X television series argues that 
there may be dangers inherent in the nostalgia for the golden age of Japan ’ s 
 “ greatest generation, ” the everymen (rarely are women foregrounded) who 
sacrificed and struggled to create the products on which growth and affluence 
were built. In the  “ good old days ” of high growth, the series asserts, when 
 “ death from overwork ” ( kar ō shi ) was not yet a legally recognized cause 
of death, inventiveness, nose-to-the-grindstone determination, production, 
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and consumption gave Japan its purpose and identity. The message was 
appealing in the uncertain times of the early twenty-first century. 
 Unfortunately, imagined golden ages can never be recovered. The sages 
of old, be they the Duke of Zhou put forward as a model by Confucius, or 
the inventors of Cup Noodles or the Walkman, cannot show Japan how to 
solve the unprecedented problems of today. Even after the many crises that 
swept Japan in the wake of the T ō hoku earthquake and tsunami, some still 
seemed to think that it would be possible to turn back the clock or simply 
stay the course. These included the nuclear power industry, some elements 
of the Liberal Democratic Party, and more than a few in the Democratic 
Party of Japan. Others were pushing in new directions. Among them were 
the richest man in Japan, Son Masayoshi, the Korean-Japanese entrepreneur 
and CEO of SoftBank, who pushed for the building of a massive solar power 
network to replace Japan ’ s dependence on nuclear power. Another was 
Mikitani Hiroshi, CEO of the internet company Rakuten, who advocated a 
thoroughgoing internationalization of Japanese corporate culture. Whether 
these or other ideas could bring back Japan ’ s optimism, and again make it 
the sort of model it was for a time in the late twentieth century, remained 
to be seen. 
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